I stopped posting to my blog after leaving for Europe to do research for various projects, including Razumijen, and to walk Hadrian's Wall with Legio X Fretensis. When I got back, a lot happened, and in a way, a lot did not happen. I was physically exhausted and somewhat drained. Walking in The Overnight in July 2006 also socked me good. I had blisters on my blisters. More than just physically drained, what I had undergone sapped me of the desire to make public many of my thoughts.
For various reasons, I did not get back to my blogs until now, in February 2007. Now, I am in the mood to write again.
Indeed, since December 2006, I have been very busy on Wikipedia, especially in relation to articles dealing with the War in Somalia, and the history of that nation. For a time there, the updates of maps and articles I worked were at the top of the Current Events page for Wikipedia. I've also taken under wing a broad series of articles having to do with the US military, such as the new US Africa Command, and the issues of extremism, whether Al-Qaeda and the followers of so-called “Al-Qaedaism” or movements of irredentism and ethnic nationalism, such as saffronization.
All of this related to Razumijen in my mind. The same issues of intolerance drove the civil wars in the Balkans, Iraq, or Somalia, or Sudan. Part of my stepping away from the west Balkans was to look at a different conflict with fresh eyes to develop a more generalized set of rules as to what drives civil wars in general. And, more precisely, I wish to develop a generalized set of models for those rules. There are concepts such as the "heat" of a conflict. Is it a "hot" war or a "cold" war? What is the tempo of action? For there certainly are times in these civil wars when dramatic, swift actions are undertaken, and other times when months if not seeming years go by with little change in fronts, or prospects for peace. Thus, I wished to watch the Somali war closely while it was unfolding, to see what decisions were made, and to read the accounts of the actors on the present world stage, to compare with the Balkans, which I can only now look at through the lens of hindsight and history.
As for Razumijen itself, progress is being made albeit slower than I hoped. I have been working on the map for the game, and am presently mulling over how precisely to represent the divided lines of control and partition of the states such as Croatia (while the Krajina area was occupied by the Krajina Serbs and the JNA), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (from the initial conquests of the Bosnian Serbs to the Vance-Owen plan, Owen-Stoltenberg, the 1994 Contact Group, and the final 1995 Dayton Agreement partition). Right now, I have a certain idea, but I reserve to change my mind.
As you can also read from my other posts, I have also been mulling over the issues of Iraq, and comparing it contextually to these other modern civil wars in former Yugoslavia and Somalia, and to a lesser extent, Sudan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. There are deep-seated social and political issues similar across all of these conflicts, and also, key differences to each.
Lastly, to balance out all of these articles about war and conflict, I also wrote an article on Wikipedia for the “Sixth Clan” women’s movement of Somalia, founded by Asha Haji Elmi. The movement grew out of her hopes for reconciliation and out of concerns for the safety of women and children in conflict-afflicted Somalia. She desired to give women a voice in the politics of Somalia, so often dominated by chauvinistic warlords. She succeeded in gaining a seat in the Somali parliament, along with 21 other women. They still have a long road ahead of them. After reading so much about the contentious clan politics of Somalia, I was struck by her poignant declaration, “My only clan is womanhood.” Hence the “Sixth Clan”—womanhood. Harkening back to my blog’s beginnings around last Martin Luther King, Jr. day, and seeing how I had not touched upon the anniversary this year, I felt this Somali civil rights movement should be celebrated. While my Wikipedia entry needed to follow a Neutral Point of View (NPOV), here, on my own blog, I must express my sense of inspiration and hope such movements transform Somalia, and for similar movements to ameliorate other war-ravaged regions. Though I am cautious to make predictions, I do pray we’ll be hearing less of the sensation headlines of bombings, shootings and rocket attacks, and more about such peaceful civic and social movements.
Friday, February 09, 2007
Iraq (2007–2010) Questions & Answers
Originally posted on the Military.com forums, 12 January 2007:
Answers to questions posed in another thread.
First, positive effects. Due to various reasons. Foreign insurgency may go down because there are not Americans to kill. The desire of a lot of mujahideen will be to move on from Iraq towards "the sound of the guns" -- to be wherever the US is still actively operating. e.g. back to Afghanistan.
A lot may also decide to leave before the Iraqis themselves consolidate domestic power and they are left without a sympathetic populace to hide amongst. They'll leave fractious sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a to the locals.
Secondly, a negative effect. Some of them, percieving they are making ground, will be all-the-more-determined to stay and topple the Iraqi government. Either that, or if things shift against them, to stay as sour-grapes and make last-ditch kamikaze attacks.
However, over time, Al Qaeda itself will fade, as local sectarian politics overwhelms the minority of the hard core Al Qaeda element.
1. Babylon - All or part of a divided Baghdad and environs.
2. Kurdistan
3. "Basra Republic" - Shi'ite south
4. Sunni Triangle - Al-Anbar Tikrit, plus portions of southern Ninewa (14), and possibly part of a divided Baghdad.
5. Assyria - City-state of Ninewa/Mosul
6. Iraqi Turkmenistan - City-state of Kirkuk
There would be a lot of ethnic cleansing and IDPs, but eventually you'd have the same sort of fragmentation that happened with Yugoslavia. Because it has some pockets of stability, and oil income, it would never become the collective basketcase that Somalia has become. Some specific areas would become basketcases, such as the desertous and violent areas.
Al Anbar would become aligned with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Basra with Iran, while also maintaining ties with the west, India and China for oil sales. The US would shore up Kurdistan. Other areas would jostle and fight, or at least compete heavily for control of resources, and vie for aid dollars and international business.
Kurdistan would likely try to hold the Assyrian, Chaldeans and Turkmens "near" them, but those minorities would likely hold out for special autonomy even if they stay within a "Kurdistan."
Turkey would never be happy, and might likely militarize the border even more, or intervene. Iran too might intervene against the Kurds.
Alternately, a regional peacekeeping force might develop, where different powers try to keep the separate warring factions apart.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States might be forced to get off their duffs and move in their own people, along with other forces from Egypt and Jordan. If it were turned over to an OIC-based peacekeeping mission, akin to how the US is pushing for an IGAD mission in Somalia, it might actually get solved without putting US forces at risk.
Answers to questions posed in another thread.
Originally posted by Airborneinfantry:Two effects simultaneously.
What do you think if we just redeploy our forces like most in your beloved party want will happen in that region?
First, positive effects. Due to various reasons. Foreign insurgency may go down because there are not Americans to kill. The desire of a lot of mujahideen will be to move on from Iraq towards "the sound of the guns" -- to be wherever the US is still actively operating. e.g. back to Afghanistan.
A lot may also decide to leave before the Iraqis themselves consolidate domestic power and they are left without a sympathetic populace to hide amongst. They'll leave fractious sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a to the locals.
Secondly, a negative effect. Some of them, percieving they are making ground, will be all-the-more-determined to stay and topple the Iraqi government. Either that, or if things shift against them, to stay as sour-grapes and make last-ditch kamikaze attacks.
However, over time, Al Qaeda itself will fade, as local sectarian politics overwhelms the minority of the hard core Al Qaeda element.
Do you think that Iraq will be a stable country?No. But there are others to blame for that besides Al Qaeda.
Do you think that Iran will stop pursuing nuclear weapons?No. But we can also move to certain more secure areas of Iraq to be nearby to monitor or even, if need be, respond to Iran, and leave some of the places in Iraq for the Iraqis themselves to take care of.
Do you think that whole region will settle down if we were to pull our forces out?Sort of in some ways, and no in others. See above. My own feeling is that there can be a sort of soft partitioning of the country. Not precisely the same as the hardcore partition and DMZ of North and South Korea, or even the Line of Control in Kashmir, but something more than the NFZs of ONW/OSW. Treaty and truce lines. It is possible to establish an uneasy peace with more sporadic violence.
I would really appreciate an objective response. Don't politicize it, tell what you forsee if we completely leave that region?If we did pull out entirely, I foresee an Iraqi Civil War which results in three or likely more devolved states or city-states comprising some mix of the following:
1. Babylon - All or part of a divided Baghdad and environs.
2. Kurdistan
3. "Basra Republic" - Shi'ite south
4. Sunni Triangle - Al-Anbar Tikrit, plus portions of southern Ninewa (14), and possibly part of a divided Baghdad.
5. Assyria - City-state of Ninewa/Mosul
6. Iraqi Turkmenistan - City-state of Kirkuk
There would be a lot of ethnic cleansing and IDPs, but eventually you'd have the same sort of fragmentation that happened with Yugoslavia. Because it has some pockets of stability, and oil income, it would never become the collective basketcase that Somalia has become. Some specific areas would become basketcases, such as the desertous and violent areas.
Al Anbar would become aligned with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Basra with Iran, while also maintaining ties with the west, India and China for oil sales. The US would shore up Kurdistan. Other areas would jostle and fight, or at least compete heavily for control of resources, and vie for aid dollars and international business.
Kurdistan would likely try to hold the Assyrian, Chaldeans and Turkmens "near" them, but those minorities would likely hold out for special autonomy even if they stay within a "Kurdistan."
Turkey would never be happy, and might likely militarize the border even more, or intervene. Iran too might intervene against the Kurds.
Alternately, a regional peacekeeping force might develop, where different powers try to keep the separate warring factions apart.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States might be forced to get off their duffs and move in their own people, along with other forces from Egypt and Jordan. If it were turned over to an OIC-based peacekeeping mission, akin to how the US is pushing for an IGAD mission in Somalia, it might actually get solved without putting US forces at risk.
What Shall Iraq Become?
The following was posted on the Military.com forums on 06 January 2007:
The Pressure of Iraqi Federacy vs. Federation
Kurdistan enjoys rights of autonomy which the southern areas around Basra wished to also enjoy.
In October 2006, Iraq passed a law allowing its regions to create their own autonomous areas. It's still up in the air as to the new alignments we'll see.
Iraq's 450,000 Christians have been pushing for autonomy. They once had twice that number, before 1991, but violence forced many into exodus. The Chaldean, Syriac, Assyrian churches are looking either for a state-within-a-state with special recognition within Kurdistan, or their own federal state.
The open question is whether and precisely how might better-organized areas of Iraq may create specially-privileged areas of the nation, making them superior to the rights or privileges enjoyed in other parts of the country. This is the deep concern driving the oil-poor western Sunni areas: a lack of a share in the nation's oil revenues, a lack of proper representation or privilege.
The issue of federacy versus federalism is what shoaled Yugoslavia. It was obvious Serbia became "more equal" to the other states. One by one, the other republics sundered themselves from those unequal relations. Even now, it dominates its two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, and it is obvious the Albanian Kosovars are not pleased with their present relationship.
What is the analogy and lesson to draw for Iraq? If the northern Kurdish region and the southern Shi'ite region are able to make special privileges for themselves, it will further fuel discontent amongst the increasingly-isolated and alienated Sunnis. Driven to desperation, they might feel that being separate from Iraq is better than being treated as inferior members of the federated nation. They do not enjoy privileges under a federacy. Thus why should they remain?
To combat this, a compromise would need to be reached with the Kurds and Shi'a. Some form of yet-to-emerge goodwill needs to break out between all parties to lessen tensions and to share benevolently in the rule of the country.
Barring such a rosy picture, incremental, creeping consolidation of power in the north and the south and the increasing sense that there is a "federacy" with unequal partners rather than a fair form of "federation" will cause Bagdhad and the west to consistently smoulder and periodically explode.
The Pressure of Iraqi Federacy vs. Federation
Kurdistan enjoys rights of autonomy which the southern areas around Basra wished to also enjoy.
In October 2006, Iraq passed a law allowing its regions to create their own autonomous areas. It's still up in the air as to the new alignments we'll see.
Iraq's 450,000 Christians have been pushing for autonomy. They once had twice that number, before 1991, but violence forced many into exodus. The Chaldean, Syriac, Assyrian churches are looking either for a state-within-a-state with special recognition within Kurdistan, or their own federal state.
The open question is whether and precisely how might better-organized areas of Iraq may create specially-privileged areas of the nation, making them superior to the rights or privileges enjoyed in other parts of the country. This is the deep concern driving the oil-poor western Sunni areas: a lack of a share in the nation's oil revenues, a lack of proper representation or privilege.
The issue of federacy versus federalism is what shoaled Yugoslavia. It was obvious Serbia became "more equal" to the other states. One by one, the other republics sundered themselves from those unequal relations. Even now, it dominates its two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, and it is obvious the Albanian Kosovars are not pleased with their present relationship.
What is the analogy and lesson to draw for Iraq? If the northern Kurdish region and the southern Shi'ite region are able to make special privileges for themselves, it will further fuel discontent amongst the increasingly-isolated and alienated Sunnis. Driven to desperation, they might feel that being separate from Iraq is better than being treated as inferior members of the federated nation. They do not enjoy privileges under a federacy. Thus why should they remain?
To combat this, a compromise would need to be reached with the Kurds and Shi'a. Some form of yet-to-emerge goodwill needs to break out between all parties to lessen tensions and to share benevolently in the rule of the country.
Barring such a rosy picture, incremental, creeping consolidation of power in the north and the south and the increasing sense that there is a "federacy" with unequal partners rather than a fair form of "federation" will cause Bagdhad and the west to consistently smoulder and periodically explode.
What do the Iraqis want?
The following was originally posted on the Military.com forums on 06 January 2007:
The critical issue the US is faced with is not in whether US domestic policy wishes to achieve "victory" in Iraq so much as what the Iraqis themselves want.
1. Iraqi leadership is flagging - Iraq Prime Minister Wishes He Could Quit- "I didn't want to take this position... I only agreed because I thought it would serve the national interest, and I will not accept it again."
2. Iraqi demands for autonomy increase - Iraqi Kurds Detail Demands for a Degree of Autonomy (18 Feb 2005), Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq (Joe Biden, 1 May 2006)
The Iraqi desire for separatism versus federalism is the key trend. Even if we stayed for a decade, what are the Iraqis themselves trending towards? Would would there be an "Iraq" to defend? One article that runs counter to the ideas of separatism struck some chords with me:
Iraq's partition fantasy (Reidar Visser, 19 May 2006)
Visser is pushing a book, Basra, and a thesis arguing Iraq is not like former Yugoslavia. Yet the issues are similar. Many people in Yugoslavia at first considered themselves "Yugoslav" versus "Croats," "Serbs," "Slovenes," "Bosniaks," "Albanians," "Kosovars," "Macedonians," etc. But that number faded as Tito's life ebbed away, and his legacy was lost in time. A decade after Tito's death showed a great difference. By the outbreak of the 1991-1995 wars, the vast majority abandoned the concept of a unified "Yugoslavia," and identified themselves primarily with their ethnicity. Is the same trend happening in Iraq? In other words, where is the sense of political "self" for the majority of the people in the nation?
Without a Saddam, is the concept of "Iraq" also faded? Would it take a decade? Should we look out 5-10 years to project the likelihood of breakdown of the government, or will matters be settled by then?
Iraqi Federalism vs. Separatists
As of September 2006, the belief that Iraq will stay together for five years is 72% versus 28% who believe it will divide. The strongest beliefs towards separate states are amongst Sunni (45%) and Kurd (35%), which means that it is the Shi'a who believe it will stay together. Of course, being the largest minority, they would benefit the most from it staying under their control. This is the key trend to watch in the coming years.
This comes from a poll called Majorities of All Iraqi Ethnic Groups Want Strong Central Government. The title of that report is somewhat misleading. Iraqi opinion is about evenly mixed as to whether the central government has too much or too little power. The Kurds think it has too little power. The Sunni think it has too much. The actual slimmest numbers are amongst those who think Iraq's central government's power is "About Right." Most think it has either too much or too little. Which means extremist views are more prevalent than views of moderates.
Fingers in the Dike
The US military itself is now split on the likelihood of success in Iraq. While most want more troops in Iraq, about 80% think it unlikely they can be replaced by Iraqi troops within two years.
There is some good news, statistically provable. Year-to-year US casualties are dropping. While deaths remained about the same from 2004 to 2006: 848 in 2004, 846 in 2005, dropping slightly to 824 in 2006, wounded have dropped considerably more: 8,001 in 2004, 5,947 in 2005, and 5,676 in 2006.
Total casualties over those years: 8,849, 6,793, 6,500. More than a 26% drop in total, though less than a 5% drop over the last year.
Thus the news is not good enough to satisfy the American people. 2006 also saw a sharp uptick in casualties towards the end, reversing the trend. We'd have to be in Iraq for the better part of a decade before they stopped attacking us. Unless a dramatic change occurs -- which does not seem likely -- staying in Iraq for the next 3 years means sustaining somewhere around 15,000 - 20,000 more wounded and dead. In other words, a full division taken as casualties. The key question is whether Iraq, as such, will be around to be defended.
One disaster averted in 2006 should be noted. The Iraqi government did close down the PKK office in September to show it was cracking down on the Kurdish separatists. That was to avert military intervention by Turkey, threatened since at least May 2006. We'll have to see whether more substantive changes occur over the next year.
Iraq is under pressure. My own view is that time is running out for federalism. Trading in a unified Iraq for multiple states will not make the problems go away, but it will move towards a permanent solution.
The critical issue the US is faced with is not in whether US domestic policy wishes to achieve "victory" in Iraq so much as what the Iraqis themselves want.
1. Iraqi leadership is flagging - Iraq Prime Minister Wishes He Could Quit- "I didn't want to take this position... I only agreed because I thought it would serve the national interest, and I will not accept it again."
2. Iraqi demands for autonomy increase - Iraqi Kurds Detail Demands for a Degree of Autonomy (18 Feb 2005), Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq (Joe Biden, 1 May 2006)
The Iraqi desire for separatism versus federalism is the key trend. Even if we stayed for a decade, what are the Iraqis themselves trending towards? Would would there be an "Iraq" to defend? One article that runs counter to the ideas of separatism struck some chords with me:
Iraq's partition fantasy (Reidar Visser, 19 May 2006)
Visser is pushing a book, Basra, and a thesis arguing Iraq is not like former Yugoslavia. Yet the issues are similar. Many people in Yugoslavia at first considered themselves "Yugoslav" versus "Croats," "Serbs," "Slovenes," "Bosniaks," "Albanians," "Kosovars," "Macedonians," etc. But that number faded as Tito's life ebbed away, and his legacy was lost in time. A decade after Tito's death showed a great difference. By the outbreak of the 1991-1995 wars, the vast majority abandoned the concept of a unified "Yugoslavia," and identified themselves primarily with their ethnicity. Is the same trend happening in Iraq? In other words, where is the sense of political "self" for the majority of the people in the nation?
Without a Saddam, is the concept of "Iraq" also faded? Would it take a decade? Should we look out 5-10 years to project the likelihood of breakdown of the government, or will matters be settled by then?
Iraqi Federalism vs. Separatists
As of September 2006, the belief that Iraq will stay together for five years is 72% versus 28% who believe it will divide. The strongest beliefs towards separate states are amongst Sunni (45%) and Kurd (35%), which means that it is the Shi'a who believe it will stay together. Of course, being the largest minority, they would benefit the most from it staying under their control. This is the key trend to watch in the coming years.
This comes from a poll called Majorities of All Iraqi Ethnic Groups Want Strong Central Government. The title of that report is somewhat misleading. Iraqi opinion is about evenly mixed as to whether the central government has too much or too little power. The Kurds think it has too little power. The Sunni think it has too much. The actual slimmest numbers are amongst those who think Iraq's central government's power is "About Right." Most think it has either too much or too little. Which means extremist views are more prevalent than views of moderates.
Fingers in the Dike
The US military itself is now split on the likelihood of success in Iraq. While most want more troops in Iraq, about 80% think it unlikely they can be replaced by Iraqi troops within two years.
There is some good news, statistically provable. Year-to-year US casualties are dropping. While deaths remained about the same from 2004 to 2006: 848 in 2004, 846 in 2005, dropping slightly to 824 in 2006, wounded have dropped considerably more: 8,001 in 2004, 5,947 in 2005, and 5,676 in 2006.
Total casualties over those years: 8,849, 6,793, 6,500. More than a 26% drop in total, though less than a 5% drop over the last year.
Thus the news is not good enough to satisfy the American people. 2006 also saw a sharp uptick in casualties towards the end, reversing the trend. We'd have to be in Iraq for the better part of a decade before they stopped attacking us. Unless a dramatic change occurs -- which does not seem likely -- staying in Iraq for the next 3 years means sustaining somewhere around 15,000 - 20,000 more wounded and dead. In other words, a full division taken as casualties. The key question is whether Iraq, as such, will be around to be defended.
One disaster averted in 2006 should be noted. The Iraqi government did close down the PKK office in September to show it was cracking down on the Kurdish separatists. That was to avert military intervention by Turkey, threatened since at least May 2006. We'll have to see whether more substantive changes occur over the next year.
Iraq is under pressure. My own view is that time is running out for federalism. Trading in a unified Iraq for multiple states will not make the problems go away, but it will move towards a permanent solution.
If Iraq fragments, what's Plan B?
The following was originally posted on the Military.com forums, 06 January 2007:
My own prognostications for the future in Iraq:
1. Surge helps contain violence only temporarily but ultimately does not dramatically reduce problems. Rampant sectarian rivalry, corruption and an inability to secure the country causes a loss of trust in central government. See: Corruption: the 'second insurgency' costing $4bn a year
2. Declarations of autonomy by various factions (led first by an 8-region Shi'ite bloc, followed by Kurds in an "if they go, we go too" stance) leads Iraq away from federalism. Power starts to disburse to regional governors and militia leaders. The US becomes increasingly irrelevant in the country except as a source of money and power to back certain blocs. See: Shiite push for autonomy endangers Iraq's fragile coalition, also Iraq passes regional autonomy law
3. "Sectarian Cleansing" continues unabated, leading factional areas to enter into recriminations if not outright quasi-wars with each other over control of territory. US efforts to get them to "knock it off" fail, and the US makes tough choices as to what areas we wish to keep secure, and which areas we simply write off as not-of-interest, or pragmatically unprotectable. The US has best success in Kurdish north. South aligns with Iran, but US remains embedded because of oil infrastructure. Arab Sunnis feel increasingly isolated in center and make push for closer ties with Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Syria and Iran grow distant as they are forced to back their own sectarian allies in the ongoing feud. Baghdad is left to the Iraqis, and suffers terribly.
4. Regardless of US policy and public stance, Iraq de facto cantonizes into sectarian regions that do not get along with each other. US domestic opinion will force pulling majority of remaining troops home, as the country heads towards a Yugoslavia-like descent into partitioning, or to position them solely in areas where US interests are greatest priority (a la the Boxer Rebellion). Unless a charismatic/powerful Tito-like nationalist figure emerges to create a vision of a unified nation (which might also be accompanied with violence and repression), the country will divide. Federal government will exist, but will be increasingly ineffectual on a nation-wide basis. Cooption of central government by a faction that still benefits by its maintenance will force the others to withdraw and declare further motions for autonomy.
5. The country finally devolves into three (or more) independent states after a bloody civil war, which is where it was going anyway, but only after animosity gets to fever pitch and millions are displaced from their present homes in a divison similar to the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh division, or again, like former Yugoslavia. The US will be blamed for ignoring reality and trying to hold the nation together after everyone else saw the writing on the wall of where the course of events were leading to naturally.
6. Problems spread to region as the "Kurdish question" is called in Turkey and Iran. US hems and haws, again trying to ignore Kurdish independence the same way we went ostrich and ignored the problem of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, refusing to back Croatia and Bosnia. Much hand-wringing is done to placate the Turks in NATO. Eventually we'll have to address the problem, once it explodes in a way that cannot be ignored, at a disadvantageous position for the US to deal with due to lack of initiative. The US is forced to adopt double-standards, supporting Kurdish independence in Iran, but not in Turkey. The US ultimately backs the Kurds, but they keep a chip on their shoulder, seeing how we foot-dragged the entire time regarding supporting their cause.
7. Basra becomes a player. Wooed by both Iran and the west, Basra makes a name for itself in the Gulf. They are opposed by the other Sunni Gulf states. Still, their control of oil makes them a darling that plays off suitors left and right. They might make an unusual strategic ally in China or India.
This is the present momentum in Iraq, combined with a few guesses on my part as to how the US and others will play into the course of events.
Presently, we are cushioning the fall by the presence of our troops there, but this is where it is headed towards of its own volition. This is domestic Iraqi politics. While the US can influence it, we cannot ultimately thwart or alter these sentiments.
Unless the Iraqis can find a uniting, galvanizing leader to rally behind -- all parties -- I believe that the momentum of present events leads towards the dissolution of the country just as surely as Yugoslavia was destined to fall apart once Tito took his leave.
Iraq will not turn into Somalia post Siad Barre. But it definitely will not keep its present shape or government structure even through the rest of the decade.
That's my own thinking. Give us your own view.
-Pete.
My own prognostications for the future in Iraq:
1. Surge helps contain violence only temporarily but ultimately does not dramatically reduce problems. Rampant sectarian rivalry, corruption and an inability to secure the country causes a loss of trust in central government. See: Corruption: the 'second insurgency' costing $4bn a year
2. Declarations of autonomy by various factions (led first by an 8-region Shi'ite bloc, followed by Kurds in an "if they go, we go too" stance) leads Iraq away from federalism. Power starts to disburse to regional governors and militia leaders. The US becomes increasingly irrelevant in the country except as a source of money and power to back certain blocs. See: Shiite push for autonomy endangers Iraq's fragile coalition, also Iraq passes regional autonomy law
3. "Sectarian Cleansing" continues unabated, leading factional areas to enter into recriminations if not outright quasi-wars with each other over control of territory. US efforts to get them to "knock it off" fail, and the US makes tough choices as to what areas we wish to keep secure, and which areas we simply write off as not-of-interest, or pragmatically unprotectable. The US has best success in Kurdish north. South aligns with Iran, but US remains embedded because of oil infrastructure. Arab Sunnis feel increasingly isolated in center and make push for closer ties with Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Syria and Iran grow distant as they are forced to back their own sectarian allies in the ongoing feud. Baghdad is left to the Iraqis, and suffers terribly.
4. Regardless of US policy and public stance, Iraq de facto cantonizes into sectarian regions that do not get along with each other. US domestic opinion will force pulling majority of remaining troops home, as the country heads towards a Yugoslavia-like descent into partitioning, or to position them solely in areas where US interests are greatest priority (a la the Boxer Rebellion). Unless a charismatic/powerful Tito-like nationalist figure emerges to create a vision of a unified nation (which might also be accompanied with violence and repression), the country will divide. Federal government will exist, but will be increasingly ineffectual on a nation-wide basis. Cooption of central government by a faction that still benefits by its maintenance will force the others to withdraw and declare further motions for autonomy.
5. The country finally devolves into three (or more) independent states after a bloody civil war, which is where it was going anyway, but only after animosity gets to fever pitch and millions are displaced from their present homes in a divison similar to the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh division, or again, like former Yugoslavia. The US will be blamed for ignoring reality and trying to hold the nation together after everyone else saw the writing on the wall of where the course of events were leading to naturally.
6. Problems spread to region as the "Kurdish question" is called in Turkey and Iran. US hems and haws, again trying to ignore Kurdish independence the same way we went ostrich and ignored the problem of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, refusing to back Croatia and Bosnia. Much hand-wringing is done to placate the Turks in NATO. Eventually we'll have to address the problem, once it explodes in a way that cannot be ignored, at a disadvantageous position for the US to deal with due to lack of initiative. The US is forced to adopt double-standards, supporting Kurdish independence in Iran, but not in Turkey. The US ultimately backs the Kurds, but they keep a chip on their shoulder, seeing how we foot-dragged the entire time regarding supporting their cause.
7. Basra becomes a player. Wooed by both Iran and the west, Basra makes a name for itself in the Gulf. They are opposed by the other Sunni Gulf states. Still, their control of oil makes them a darling that plays off suitors left and right. They might make an unusual strategic ally in China or India.
This is the present momentum in Iraq, combined with a few guesses on my part as to how the US and others will play into the course of events.
Presently, we are cushioning the fall by the presence of our troops there, but this is where it is headed towards of its own volition. This is domestic Iraqi politics. While the US can influence it, we cannot ultimately thwart or alter these sentiments.
Unless the Iraqis can find a uniting, galvanizing leader to rally behind -- all parties -- I believe that the momentum of present events leads towards the dissolution of the country just as surely as Yugoslavia was destined to fall apart once Tito took his leave.
Iraq will not turn into Somalia post Siad Barre. But it definitely will not keep its present shape or government structure even through the rest of the decade.
That's my own thinking. Give us your own view.
-Pete.
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